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The evolution of cooperation among nonrelatives has been explained by direct, indirect, and strong reciprocity.
Animals should base the decision to help others on expected future help, which they may judge from past behavior of
their partner. Although many examples of cooperative behavior exist in nature where reciprocity may be involved,
experimental evidence for strategies predicted by direct reciprocity models remains controversial; and indirect and
strong reciprocity have been found only in humans so far. Here we show experimentally that cooperative behavior of
female rats is influenced by prior receipt of help, irrespective of the identity of the partner. Rats that were trained in an
instrumental cooperative task (pulling a stick in order to produce food for a partner) pulled more often for an unknown
partner after they were helped than if they had not received help before. This alternative mechanism, called
generalized reciprocity, requires no specific knowledge about the partner and may promote the evolution of
cooperation among unfamiliar nonrelatives.
Citation: Rutte C, Taborsky M (2007) Generalized reciprocity in rats. PLoS Biol 5(7): e196. doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.0050196
Introduction
Cooperation among unrelated individuals may be achieved
by reciprocal altruism in which two or more individuals help
each other in turn [1,2]. The decision to cooperate is based on
expected future help, which may be judged from past
interactions. Most theoretical models of reciprocal altruism
assume that individuals base their behavior on knowledge
about a partner’s previous behavior, either towards them-
selves (direct reciprocity [3]) or towards others (indirect
reciprocity [4–6]). According to direct reciprocity, A helps B
because B has helped A before; individuals remember who
did what in past interactions with them and base their
decision whether to cooperate or defect on this knowledge
[3]. According to indirect reciprocity, A helps B because B has
helped C before; indirect reciprocity involves reputation,
which increases through helping and is assessed to decide
whether to help a partner or not [4–6]. Both direct and
indirect reciprocity require that animals possess speciﬁc
cognitive abilities [7], which may impede the evolution of
cooperation through these mechanisms. Strong reciprocity
assumes that individuals punish noncooperators altruistically
[8–10]. So far, experimental evidence for strategies predicted
by direct reciprocity models remains controversial [11–16],
and indirect and strong reciprocity have been found only in
humans so far [8,17] (but see [18] for a possible example at the
interspeciﬁc level in a cleaner ﬁsh mutualism).
Recent theoretical models have shown that cooperation
could evolve even without individual recognition in small
groups when individuals base their decision on the outcome
of previous interactions with anonymous partners [19,20].
This mechanism, called generalized reciprocity (also ‘‘up-
stream tit-for-tat,’’ or ‘‘upstream indirect reciprocity’’
[21,22]), leads to cooperation because previous interactions
provide information about the overall level of cooperation
within the group. For instance, if it pays more to cooperate in
a cooperative environment than in a noncooperative one,
generalized reciprocity may establish stable levels of cooper-
ation when the decision to stay or leave a group evolves
simultaneously with the decision to cooperate [23]. The
selective force promoting cooperation in generalized reci-
procity is thus of the type Lehmann and Keller [24] classiﬁed
as ‘‘repeated interactions with direct or indirect information
on the behavior of the partner in previous moves.’’ However,
it is important to note that under generalized reciprocity,
individual recognition and speciﬁc social memory are not
required, hence possibly this represents a more general
mechanism leading to cooperation in animals than direct and
indirect reciprocity, which require cognitive abilities poten-
tially impeding their operation in animals [16,25]. Simple
decision rules such as ‘‘walk away when encountering non-
cooperation’’ may sufﬁce to stabilize cooperation [26].
Generalized reciprocity has been shown in humans; prior
receipt of help increased the propensity to help a stranger
[27–29]. A typical situation to show that past positive
experience increases the future helpfulness of subjects
towards unknown persons is that people who found a coin
in the coin return of a public telephone were more likely to
help a stranger pick up papers that had been dropped than
control subjects [30]. To know whether such behavior is
caused by cultural experience or shaped by natural selection,
it is important to study whether similar reactions to
anonymous experience can be found in nonhuman animals,
which would clearly hint that an evolutionary mechanism is
involved. For generalized reciprocity, special cognitive
abilities are not required, as individuals only need to
remember and act upon their own last experience with any
partner. This may work with the help of rather simple
hormonal or neuronal mechanisms triggering the propensity
to cooperate. Yet, so far, to our knowledge, no experimental
study has investigated the inﬂuence of anonymous prior
experience on cooperative behavior in nonhuman animals.
Here, we studied whether cooperative behavior in rats is
inﬂuenced by social experience, irrespective of the identity of
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PLoS BIOLOGYpartners. First, we trained female wild-type rats (Rattus
norvegicus) in an instrumental cooperative task; by pulling a
stick ﬁxed to a baited tray a rat produced food for its partner
but not for herself (Figure 1A). Second, we manipulated the
focal rat’s experience to receive help from a series of
unfamiliar partners. The focal rat either experienced help
by three different partner rats that pulled, or it experienced
no help by three different partner rats that did not pull
(Figure 1B). Subsequently, we tested the focal rat’s propensity
to help another unfamiliar partner by recording the number
of pulls it performed in a given period (Figure 1C). One day
after the experiment, we noted the pulling rate of each focal
rat when alone in the experimental cage to check for intrinsic
differences in pulling frequency (Figure 1D). The situation
was equivalent to the experiment, where the rat could move
the platform into the cage by pulling but was unable to reach
the reward.
Results
Test rats that recently experienced help pulled more often
than when they had not experienced help (Figure 2). The
pulling frequency was on average 21% higher in the helper
treatment than in the nonhelper treatment (median ¼ 0.86
pulls/min compared to 0.71 pulls/min; Z ¼ 2.462; n ¼19; and
p ¼ 0.014). The median interval between placing an oat ﬂake
on the platform and pulling by the rat was shorter after
cooperative experience than after receiving no help. Rats
with previous experience of help pulled on average four times
earlier (medians: helper treatment, 6 s; nonhelper treatment,
24 s; Z¼ 2.486; n¼17; and p¼0.013; this difference is similar
when the two rats that did not pull in one of the two
treatments are included in the analysis, assuming an inﬁnite
pulling delay; Z ¼ 2.133; n ¼ 19; and p ¼ 0.033). However, the
latency of the very ﬁrst pull that the rats performed in the test
situation did not differ signiﬁcantly between both treatments
(medians: helper treatment, 13 s; nonhelper treatment, 34 s; Z
¼ 0.853; n¼17; and p¼0.39). The baseline pulling frequency
when alone in the cage was lower (median ¼ 0.29 pulls/min)
than in the test phases of the helper treatment (p , 0.01) and
nonhelper treatments (p ¼ 0.017), respectively, and it did not
differ between treatments (medians ¼ 0.29 and 0.29; n ¼ 10 þ
9; U¼43.5; and p¼0.84). Therefore, the intrinsic tendency to
pull was not inﬂuenced by the experimental treatments.
Discussion
Our results show that prior social experience changes the
propensity of rats to cooperate, irrespective of the identity of
the partner. After experiencing cooperation a rat is more
helpful towards a new partner than after receiving no help.
This indicates that reciprocal cooperation in iterated
encounters is not necessarily based on speciﬁc knowledge
about the partner, but that any prior experience of
cooperation can be used. It is worth noting that pulling the
stick was a cooperative act to the rats; they pulled very little
when alone in the cage, and their intrinsic pulling frequen-
cies did not differ after being subjected to the helper or
nonhelper treatments.
Which alternative learning mechanisms might explain the
behavior of rats in our experiment? Instrumental condition-
ing can be excluded as a mechanism to explain the observed
behavior, because the test rat was not rewarded for her own
behavior during the experience phase. Classical conditioning
is unlikely, as in the nonhelper treatment focal rats also
received the same amount of food. Also, both forms of
conditioning are not supported by the data, because the
intrinsic tendency to pull as measured at the end of the
experiment was clearly not inﬂuenced by the experimental
treatments. We can exclude that the focal rats in the
nonhelper treatment learned that the platform would not
work, because the nonhelper partner rats had not been
trained in the pulling task and therefore did not even try to
manipulate the stick or to pull. Also, the very ﬁrst pulling
latency of test rats did not differ between treatments. For the
latter reason it is also unlikely that the differing performance
was caused by ‘‘forgetting’’ how to perform the task in the
nonhelper situation, when observations of a pulling rat were
not as recent as in the helper treatment. Social learning is
also implausible to be responsible for the different behavior
of rats in both treatments; experience and test phases were
performed on different days, so social facilitation was not
involved. True imitation is unlikely, because (1) the focal rat
was able to perform the required behavior already long
before the experimental test in both the helper and non-
helper treatments, (2) the focal rat did not perform the
behavior herself right after observing the partner rat in the
experience phase, but only about 24 h later, and (3) imitation
could hitherto not be demonstrated in rats despite intensive
study [31].
Generalized reciprocity is hence the only hypothesis fully
consistent with our results; the rats helped an unknown
conspeciﬁc more readily because they received help before,
even if from another anonymous partner. This is compatible
with an ‘‘anonymous generous tit-for-tat’’-like strategy, which
was shown to establish cooperation in small groups [20]. To
our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst evidence for generalized
reciprocity in nonhuman animals. The existence of this form
of cooperation does not necessarily imply, however, that
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Author Summary
The evolution of cooperation is based on four general mechanisms:
mutualism, where an action benefits all partners directly; kin
selection, where related individuals are supported; ‘‘green beard’’
altruism that is based on a genetic correlation between altruism
genes and respective markers; and reciprocal altruism, where helpful
acts are contingent upon the likelihood of getting help in return.
The latter mechanism is intriguing because it is prone to
exploitation. In theory, reciprocal altruism may evolve by direct,
indirect, ‘‘strong,’’ and generalized reciprocity. Apart from direct
reciprocity, where individuals base their behavior towards a partner
on that partner’s previous behavior towards themselves, and which
works under only highly restrictive conditions, no other mechanism
for reciprocity has been demonstrated among conspecifics in
nonhuman animals. Here, we tested the propensity of wild-type
Norway rats to help unknown conspecifics in response to help
received from other unknown partners in an instrumental cooper-
ative task. Anonymous receipt of help increased their propensity to
help by more than 20%, revealing that nonhuman animals may
indeed show generalized reciprocity. This mechanism causes
altruistic behavior by previous social experience irrespective of
partner identity. Generalized reciprocity is hence much simpler and
therefore more likely to be important in nature than other
reciprocity mechanisms.other selective forces are not at work in rats. In a follow-up
study we tested whether the propensity to cooperate would
be increased further when Norway rats interacted with a
known partner who had helped them before [32]. As
expected, this direct reciprocity caused even higher levels
of cooperation than generalized reciprocity, i.e., a rat was
50.7% more likely to help a conspeciﬁc who had helped her
before than an unknown rat after experiencing cooperation
with anonymous partners. This is compatible with a
‘‘hierarchical information hypothesis’’ assuming that speciﬁc
information about the helping propensity of a partner is
used if available, but if not, anonymous social experience is
used when deciding whether to cooperate or not [32], i.e.,
cooperation may ensue also when speciﬁc information is
limited or costly to be obtained. A similar mechanism might
operate in humans [29]. Theoretical models showed that the
existence of direct reciprocity in a population will induce the
evolution of generalized reciprocity [22], entailing much
higher levels of cooperation overall. It is worth noting that
despite the fact that direct reciprocity also operates in
Norway rats, the results of this study cannot be accounted for
by direct reciprocity in connection with errors in identifying
individuals; the same individuals were tested in both
experimental situations, so recognition errors cannot have
biased the results in one direction.
Generalized reciprocity is functionally related to the
winner and loser effects, where anonymous social experience
also inﬂuences behavior in subsequent interactions (in this
case agonistic behavior [33–35]). On the proximate level,
physiological and neurological mechanisms causing winner/
loser effects and generalized reciprocity might be similar [36].
It has been demonstrated experimentally that primates and
rats exposed to socio-positive or socio-negative experience
show signiﬁcant hormonal changes [37,38]. These may
critically affect the tendency to cooperate. Recently, oxytocin
was shown to inﬂuence human prosocial behavior [39,40], and
it might also mediate positive social interactions in nonhu-
man animals [41]. A neurological study of human cooperative
behavior showed that in women playing the prisoner’s
dilemma game, mutual cooperation was associated with
consistent activation in brain areas linked with reward
processing [42], e.g., the anteroventral striatum. When
electrodes are placed in the striatum of rats, the animals will
repeatedly press a bar to stimulate the electrodes [43]. Rilling
and coworkers [42] suggested that the activation of these
brain areas might positively reinforce reciprocal altruism.
Our experiment revealed that cooperative behavior of
Norway rats is inﬂuenced by anonymous social experience,
despite their ability to distinguish individuals and their
tendency to help particularly those who have helped them
before [32]. We believe that this result may affect future
studies of cooperation in two important ways. First, empirical
data suggesting the potential operation of direct reciprocity
may sometimes be interpreted more parsimoniously in terms
of generalized reciprocity. So far, adequate controls to
differentiate between direct and generalized reciprocity are
missing in empirical studies of reciprocal altruism [44–46],
except for a study on chimpanzees demonstrating partner-
speciﬁc exchange of altruistic acts [47] and our study on rats
[32]. Second, theoretical approaches attempting to explain
cooperation in an evolutionary context should account for
the potential involvement of generalized reciprocity.
Materials and Methods
Subjects. The rats were bred from eight pairs of wild-type rats
(Animal Physiology Department, University of Groningen, Nether-
Figure 2. Experience Influences Cooperation
Rats pulled more often after help experience (filled dots) than after
receiving no help (open triangles). On average the rats’ propensity to pull
was 21% higher in the test treatment. Numbers with the same first digit
denote individuals from the same family (e.g., 10, 11, and 12 were
siblings).
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.0050196.g002
Figure 1. Rats Cooperate in an Instrumental Task
(A) Experimental set-up: two rats in the test cage are separated by a wire
mesh. By pulling a stick fixed to a baited tray one rat produces food (an
oat flake) for the partner rat but is not rewarded herself for this behavior.
(B) Experience phase: the focal rat (black) either experienced help by
three different partner rats (A, B, or C) that pulled (test treatment; help is
indicated by an arrow), or it experienced no help by three different
partner rats (D, E, or F) that did not pull (control treatment; no help is
indicated by a crossed arrow).
(C) Test phase: the pulling behavior of the focal rat was tested against a
new partner (rat G).
(D) Solo pulling control: the pulling behavior of the focal rats was tested
when alone in the cage. The time schedule of the experiment is also
shown. Each focal rat was exposed to both test and control treatments in
a randomized sequence. There was a four-day interval between the first
experimental test (day 6) and the start of the second experience phase
(on day 11).
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.0050196.g001
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seven in cages (80 cm 3 50 cm 3 37.5 cm). Female groups could not
interact with each other between cages because of the arrangement of
cages. The housing room had an average temperature of 22 8C and a
12:12 h light:dark cycle with lights on at 20:00 hours. Food
(conventional rat pellets) and water was provided ad libitum. Rats
are predominantly nocturnal, and thus we performed our experi-
ments during the dark phase in the morning hours.
Pre-experimental training. Only female rats were used in the
experiment. The training of the rats in the operant cooperative task
(which is similar to the task used in [44,46]) consisted of two steps.
First, a single rat learned to pull a stick ﬁxed to a baited platform to
move it into the cage and reach the reward (one oat ﬂake). All rats
learned to pull the stick in this situation within the ﬁrst two trials of
10 min each. Second, each rat learned to pull alternately with a
littermate, providing access to food for each other (Figure 1A). For
this, the two rats were placed in a cage that was separated into two
compartments by a wire mesh. Only one rat had access to the stick
and the opportunity to move the baited platform into the cage. The
pulling rat had no access to the reward, only its partner did. In a
subsequent session the roles were exchanged. Initially the partners
pulled shortly after each other (i.e., one partner had to pull four
times, then, the roles were exchanged immediately). The interval
between the exchanges of roles was gradually increased to two days
over a period of eight weeks. During this training phase each rat had
35 sessions in which she was in the role of the donor and 35 sessions
in which she was in the role of the receiver, and she only interacted
with one speciﬁc littermate. All rats pulled in this cooperative
situation. The pulling rate was signiﬁcantly higher when the partner
was present than when the second compartment was empty (medians
[Wilcoxon-Test]: alone, 0.5; partner present, 0.8; p , 0.001; n ¼ 20),
indicating that the propensity to pull was socially inﬂuenced (see
[48]). Thus the rats learned to cooperate by pulling the stick and to
reciprocate with a speciﬁc partner. In our experiment we used this
learned instrumental cooperative behavior to test the inﬂuence of
social experience on cooperation in rats.
Experiment. In the experiment, only rats were paired that were
unfamiliar with each other (i.e., had not interacted before) and came
from different cages (i.e., were not closely related). The focal rats were
ﬁrst exposed to a situation where they either received help (test
treatment) or not (control treatment) from different partners to get
food (Figure 1B). In this experience phase the focal rats themselves
could not pull for their respective partners. All 19 focal rats were
exposed to both treatments in a random sequence. In the test
treatment, on ﬁve successive days the rats received help from three
different partners that pulled and moved the reward within reach of
the focal rat (i.e., two partner rats were used twice). Each focal rat had
only one session per day. The nine different helping partners had
been trained in alternated pulling and were randomly assigned to the
test rats. As an incentive each helping partner had been rewarded for
pulling shortly before the test rat was put into the experimental cage.
The session continued until the partner had pulled eight times, which
was achieved on average within seven minutes. In the control
treatment, the rats were paired with three different partners that
did not pull. The nine nonhelping partners had not been trained in
pulling, and the platform was mechanically prevented from moving
towards the cage. In any other respect they did not differ from the
helping partners, including familiarity with the experimental cage.
Each partner was randomly assigned to the control rat. Again, the
duration of a trial was seven minutes, and each focal rat had one
session per day on ﬁve consecutive days. During each control session
the experimenter also baited the tray eight times with one oat ﬂake
on the side of the focal rat. After each session the partner rat was
removed ﬁrst, and the focal rat received the eight oat ﬂakes on the
tray. To test for potential differences in behavior of partner rats
between the test and control treatments during the experience phase,
we compared the behavior of the nine trained and nine nontrained
partners when paired with the same focal rat. The analysis revealed
that there was neither a difference in the partner rats’ social
interactions with the focal rat (p ¼ 0.86 and Z ¼  0.178), nor in their
general activity (p¼0.26 and Z¼ 1.125), nor in the time spent in the
quadrant in which they had access to the stick (p ¼ 0.77 and Z ¼
 0.296) (Wilcoxon-Tests). Therefore, to the best of our knowledge the
only difference for the focal rats between treatments was experienc-
ing help or not.
On day six, each focal rat was paired with a new partner and
consequently was in the role of the potential helper (Figure 1C). The
number of pulls performed by the rat was noted during a period of
seven minutes. After four days, we repeated the experimental
procedure by switching the experience treatment given to the focal
rats. The partner rats providing the opposite experience were again
new to the focal rats, whereas in the subsequent test helping behavior
of each focal rat was tested with the same individuals as in the
preceding treatment. Again, the focal rat herself did not pull in the
entire experience phase. Observations were conducted in a blind
fashion such that the experimenter did not know which focal rat was
in the trial. The experimenter recorded the interactions on a monitor
while sitting behind a sliding door. A new oat ﬂake was placed on the
platform ten seconds after each pulling event (i.e., after the partner
rat usually had consumed the food). One day after the experiment, we
compared the pulling rate of ten focal rats that had received help in
the second part of the experiment with the pulling rate of nine focal
rats that had not received help recently, when alone in the
experimental cage (Figure 1D). The rats could move the platform
into the cage by pulling but were unable to reach the reward.
Statistics. Data were analyzed with nonparametric statistics using
the software package SPSS 11.0 (SPSS, http://www.spss.com). We
compared individuals across treatments using two-tailed Wilcoxon
matched-pairs signed-ranks tests. Bonferroni correction was applied
to account for multiple testing (pulling frequency and latency), thus
reducing the signiﬁcance level to a9¼0.025. For analyzing differences
in pulling frequency between treatment groups after the experiment
we used the Mann-Whitney U-Test.
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